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The phenomenon of addiction precedes, by millennia, our scientific inquiries into its
psychological manifestations and neural bases. We did not need psychiatrists to
‘discover’ it; we have long been aware of its dark shadow lurking in our psyches. The
discernable, often troubling behaviors of addicts notwithstanding, addiction is not the
kind of phenomenon one observes; addiction is experienced, from the first-person
perspective. Its defining features are qualitative: a subjective loss of control, an
obsession, a compulsion. The overwhelming phenomenological salience of these
features—especially of “compulsion”—has led addicts, philosophers, and psychiatrists
alike to imagine that addiction is a discrete (phenomenological, natural, psychological)
kind. In this essay, I argue that addicted phenomenology is different only in degree from
ordinary human experience, and not in kind. This conclusion’s major premise derives
from our present-best neuropsychological theories of addiction; together, they
successfully explain the defining phenomenological features of addiction while applying,
mutatis mutandis, to garden-variety experiences of compulsion. I distinguish between
essential and contingent features of addicted phenomenology, which allows for
ontological clarity around what it is, exactly, we are talking about when we talk about
addiction and demonstrates that the identity-criteria of what we call “addiction” are not
phenomenally immanent, so to speak, but are external, contextual and—ultimately—
contingent.

I. Introduction. Nearly half a century has elapsed since Thomas Nagel first published his
landmark essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The demarcation criterion contained therein is
brilliant in its ontic simplicity: an organism “has conscious mental states” just in case “there is
something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.”1 Whether
one learned of it first in 1974, reading the Philosophical Review, or this side of the millennium in
Mortal Questions, the conceptual heft of the ‘what it is like’ criterion strikes the adequatelyprimed reader as so plausible, so intuitive, that perhaps we might have articulated the divide
between the mental and the non exactly thus.
In my admiration for Nagel and his chiropteran opus I am in the fine company of the philosopher
Owen Flanagan. We have more in common than a refined taste in philosophical literature,
however. Pertinently—and to our mutual detriment—we share also a fascination with different
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chemical molecules and their corresponding phenomenological effects on consciousness: why
does (say) morphine ingestion produce a sort of euphoric sleepiness, like being in a warm bath,
while a hit of crack cocaine superimposes upon consciousness a blisteringly intense, all-salient
ecstasy? For Flanagan and myself, the appeal of questions such as these at some point
transcended the detached abstraction of the philosopher. Although our drugs of choice differed,
we both eventually watched, helpless, as our predilection for the effects of some molecule or
other seemed to rob us of our agency. We experienced a fracturing of our very selves across the
fault lines of our volitions. To wit: Flanagan is a drug addict. So am I.
What is an addict-cum-philosopher, armed with the Nagelian criterion and some modicum of
sobriety, to make of his experience? In Flanagan’s case, he chronicles the phenomenological
character of his addiction. The title of his compelling essay surely wrote itself: “What Is It Like
to Be an Addict?” Indeed. Riffing on Nagel, he briefly covers the conceptual ‘greatest hits’ of
“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (e.g., the brute impenetrability of the first-person perspective by
the third, the fundamental irreducibility of subjectivity, etc.). For Flanagan, however, the
Nagelian problem is intractable only in the case of interspecies communication. The
phenomenological chasm between human and bat is unbridgeable in principle, but “we [humans]
are members of the same species, and we are language users, so there are prospects for mutual
understanding in the case of addiction. So let me tell you a bit about what it was like [to be an
addict].”2
Of course, we can communicate our subjective experiences—even those concerning chemicallyaltered mental states—to people who have not, strictly speaking, experienced them. This is a
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truism borne out across entire genres of literature. I take no issue with the possibility of memoir
as such and—where Flanagan functions as memoirist—I bring no criticisms to bear. The fact of
this possibility (evidenced by its actuality) suggests to me that Flanagan is not puritanical in his
Nagelianism. I cannot, no matter how eloquent my prose, communicate the redness of red to
someone without sight; if a lion (or a bat) could speak, I would not understand him. How is it
that ‘what it is like’ to be an addict is not similarly ineffable?
Addicted experience is in principle communicable because, I will argue, its constitutive,
functional properties just are universal features of human phenomenology. I intend to use
Flanagan’s work as a stalking-horse with which to get my own case off the ground. Thus, I begin
with a sketch of his essay, his philosophical conclusions, and their implications for our
conceptual models of addiction. Dispensing with Flanagan’s ontological excesses, I export only
those entities which I deem essential from his account and provide a philosophical articulation of
each. I proceed by contrasting their structural relations to those of the relevant neuropsychiatrictheoretical frameworks. In so doing, I find that these entities—which Flanagan supposes to be
jointly constitutive of phenomenological addiction—just are variations of an ordinary
phenomenological theme and attempt to follow the error to its roots. I conclude with the
conjecture that our addicted-phenomenological reports are tacitly informed by prevailing ‘folk’
models of addiction; an addict’s introspection is just another form of observation, and as such, it
is theory-laden.
II. Phenomenological taxonomy. Do we really need a phenomenology of addiction? Ought we
not leave such accounts to literature, to music, or to the addicts themselves, within the rooms of
Alcoholics Anonymous? Flanagan believes that we do; he makes the case that even with a
completed neuroscientific theory of addiction—once we’ve exhausted all the
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neurocomputational facts about brains and different molecules’ effects on them—no “full
accounting” of addiction can be complete absent the texturing of the phenomenological. 3 To
accomplish this texturing, Flanagan recommends his “Natural Method,” a holistic, coherentist
amendment to scientific inquiry. His holarchy requires a phenomenological ‘scaffolding’ upon
which to attach our scientific theories. Furthermore, it requires a degree of commensurability
between the entities of our competing conceptual frameworks.
He writes: “Suppose that the neuroscience of addiction revealed that all substance addictions
involve exactly the same neural processes. I would say keep looking because the recognizable
differences in phenomenological feelings produced by different drugs are robust among the
people who use them.”4 No conceptual “level” (e.g., neuroscientific, psychological,
phenomenological), he writes, is “trump”—each plays a necessary epistemic role—but I take his
requirement that neuroscience “keep looking” to mean that our scientific theories of addiction
must, in a sense, function as explanations for the qualitative hallmarks of addictive
phenomenology.
Very well. I am sympathetic to Flanagan’s requirement that our different conceptual schemas
play nicely with one another. Although his no-trump holarchy turns out to be a hierarchy after
all—with phenomenology as its arbitrating strata, no less—it is plausible enough to insist that
our scientific theories, if they are to be good for anything, function as explanations for why it
feels like something to be addicted that is different from what it is like to (say) crave ice cream
but refrain from partaking.
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Although he offers no explicit model for successful neuropsychological explanations, Flanagan’s
Natural Method requires of our (scientific) explanantia that they be explanatorily relevant for or
structurally analogous to our explananda (which, in this case, are the puzzling experiences
central to addicted phenomenology). I will refer to this as the commensurability requirement.
The commensurability requirement entails that our explanandum must include addiction’s
phenomenological features; thus, our scientific explanans requires that we sufficiently articulate
just what, exactly, said features are. Such an articulation is not assumed (or given) so much as it
is created;5 thus, the (eventual) commensurability between our scientific explanantia hinges on,
as Flanagan argues, getting the phenomenology right. He believes our explananda are bestdeveloped within a taxonomically-structured articulation of addictive phenomenology. It is here
where daylight begins to emerge between his position and my own.
“A complete phenomenology of addiction,” he writes, “would need… ‘what it is like’ reports
on… Addictalcohol and Addictbenzodiazepines and Addictopiate.” These taxa can be further subdivided
into “AddictXanax, lorazepam, clonazepam and Addictmorphine, codeine, heroin.”6 Flanagan reasons that each of
the above-listed molecules has a unique phenomenological feel—each has its own distinct or
semi-distinct suite of qualitative effects on consciousness—and thus, it is like something to be
addicted to alcohol that is different from what it is like to be addicted to methamphetamine. Is it
the case, however, that a complete account of addiction must be informed by such a breadth of
possible alterations to consciousness? Is the qualitative difference between a heroin and a
cocaine high relevant to the experience of being addicted, or merely the phenomenology of
getting high?

5
6

Or so the saying goes. See Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.”
Flanagan, 272.

7
Flanagan acknowledges this conceptual contrast: “There is something it is like to be an addict, or
what is different, to be addicted, to be ‘high,’” but makes too little of its importance.7 His is an
ontology of potentially infinite discrimination, and its wealth of possible subjectivity is its
undoing. There is, of course, something it is like to be (say) a lifelong alcoholic, finding himself
yet again incapable of declining the second drink. His experience is (necessarily)
phenomenologically unlike that of the novice heroin user who does not understand why or how
she pawned a treasured heirloom to afford more junk. The constitutive identity of any
chemically-altered mental state is composed of a set of n factors, almost all of which (e.g., the
personal history of the user, their present environment, arbitrarily minute, quantitative variations
of the drug ingested) are nonessential to addiction as such. So thorough an ontology cannot make
useful distinctions between types—addiction, say, versus non-addiction—and swells into a trivial
mapping: one token per type. That is not to say that such distinctions are of no importance at
all—but they cannot serve as a foundation for or arbiter of scientific theory. In order to tease
signal from noise, we must ask: what properties are constitutive of addiction? What properties
are essential to it, and which are mere accidentals, contingent and—ultimately—extraneous?
III. Constituents of addiction. Luckily, neither Flanagan nor myself requires the full scope of
his unwieldy taxonomy in order to pick out universal features of addiction. Each of the (what I
call) contingent aspects of addictive phenomenology (e.g., context, personal identity, drug of
choice) he cordons off under the heading “addiction-2,” which incorporates all those variables
that differ across “individuals” and “communities of users.” 8 Per Flanagan, every addict-2 has in
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common with every other two “features” that are “invariant.”9 These are (1) a mental obsession
and (2) a physical compulsion (jointly, “addiction-1”).10
Mental obsession seems to be the kind of experience that most—perhaps even all—addicts can
testify to having. Flanagan articulates it thus: mental obsession is what it is like when “you are
always thinking about where, when and how you will next use.”11 This feature of addictive
phenomenology—a near-constant directedness of the mind toward a drug or drug-seeking—
seems at least a contender for a constitutive property of addiction. It has, after all, a close
counterpart in standard psychiatric practice;12 although the DSM-5 focuses almost exclusively on
behavioral symptoms in its diagnostic criteria for substance-use disorders, its single mentalistic
criterion can be interpreted as an obsession, though the Manual dubs it “craving.”13
Of course, one can obsess over anything. Perhaps a mental obsession is a necessary property of
addicted phenomenology, but it can hardly be sufficient. In his monograph The Disordered
Mind, the philosopher of psychiatry George Graham mentions “obsessions” nearly fifty times,
and in each case is considering a mental phenomenon other than addiction. By itself, “obsession”
could just as easily cover a jilted ex-lover whose waking mental life is consumed by thoughts of
his former partner. It should be obvious that “addicted,” though it may apply to him roughly, is
not the most elucidatory label with which to conceptualize his problem. Thus we require a
second property—physical compulsion—to round out a set of jointly-sufficient
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phenomenological features that, taken together, are constitutive of what we are talking about
when we talk about “addiction.”
Physical compulsion is the experience wherein, Flanagan writes, “the car turns into the liquor
store, you do not; the drinking is done… but in some sense it is not me.”14 This is the experience
of the addict from which emerge the tropes of our folk conceptualization of addiction:
powerlessness, neural hijackings,15 drinks taking drinks, and so on. Much like mental obsession,
taken by itself the compulsion criterion could describe any host of ticks, reflexes, and
involuntary behaviors. When both criteria are present, however, we are talking about a bona fide
addiction. For Flanagan, their simultaneous presence in consciousness cumulates in a “P & ~P
performative inconsistency”—wanting to do one thing, but finding himself unable (in a
particular context) to shake his obsession and regain authorial control.
Of the two, the phenomenology of the compulsion criterion is the harder to tidily pin down and
articulate. (“Mental obsession” is nearer to being an intuitively universal experience, so long as
the intentional objects “drug” and “drug-seeking” are replaced by ones with more quotidian
referents.) Controversial—and harder for the nonaddict to understand—is the claim of the addict
that he could not really help himself when he decided to use. What do we addicts mean when we
speak of experiences like losing our volition or having no control? A remarkably apt account of
an addict’s physical compulsion comes from Harry Frankfurt’s classic “Freedom of the Will and
Concept of a Person.”
According to him, as an addict, I have conflicting first-order desires. (First-order desires could be
said to provide the immediate causal ‘thrust’ to my actions; per Frankfurt, they constitute my
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will). Humans and persons are not unique in having first-order desires; a dog may have a firstorder desire to chase a cat, and a laboratory mouse may have a first-order desire for the cocainelaced water bottle. For the nonhuman animal, the first-order desire merely litigates what she will
next do. Humans, however, have a brand of ‘free will,’ which—for Frankfurt—just is the ability
to choose which of their first-order desires becomes, ultimately, their will.16 The (nonaddict)
agent has the first-order desire to go for a run but also the conflicting first-order desire to sit on
the couch, and it is in the case of competing first-order desires that second-order volitions come
into play. The nonaddict identifies with the desire to desire to go on a run; he wants to want to
run and does not want to want to sit on the couch. Volitions situated thusly, his ultimate
behavior—going on a run—is wholly his own.
Not so for the addict. I may have the first-order desire to obtain and use heroin. I also have a
first-order desire (so I report) to not obtain or use heroin. (I want to P and to ~P.) Now, I do not
want to be an addict. Rationally, I understand that the consequences of my use (e.g.,
imprisonment, interpersonal conflict, death) will directly conflict with others of my long-term
desires (e.g., to get married, to become a philosopher). Suppose, then, that I identify with my
second-order volition to want to want to ~P.17 I consider myself to be, fundamentally, the kind of
person who does want to get married and does want to become a philosopher, not the kind of
person who goes to jail or overdoses. Who I am is a person who wants to want to ~P. When I
find myself P-ing, I am—justifiably—confused and surprised, and if it becomes a pattern in my
life, I might become hopeless and utter phrases like “I am powerless to stop using heroin.” If I
am philosophically inclined, I may seek to develop a phenomenology of addiction for which the
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development of at least one criterion will come painlessly: addiction must involve an experience
of physical compulsion in which my autonomy as an agent is frustrated. P & ~P.
With the articulations of the compulsion and obsession criteria sketched above, we arrive at a
tentative pair of phenomena that require explanation. Because nothing about addiction hinges on
the contingent phenomenological features of a person’s identity or situation—addiction-2—we
can discard these entries from our explanandum. Thus purged, we say that a person experiences
addiction if and only if they experience a mental obsession coupled with a simultaneous (if
intermittent) physical compulsion.18 I have claimed that it is uncontroversial that obsession
occurs in nonaddicts; the concept of “obsession” intuitively admits of variations in degree which
never bifurcate into (qualitatively) discrete kinds. Thus it remains to be seen only whether
relevant scientific theory can account for the salient phenomenological character of physical
compulsion.
IV. Neuropsychological theories of compulsion. What is going on in the brain of an addict
when she experiences the “me-but-not-me” who takes the drink or drug, despite her identifying
with the desire to abstain? In a seminal contribution to the canon of scientific literature on
addiction, Robinson and Berridge propose a motivational model with discrete neural mechanisms
for two functions that are typically taken to be virtual synonyms: their “incentive-sensitization”
theory of addiction distinguishes, pertinently, between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking.’19
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Namely, wanting and liking—though they can be and indeed often are intimately linked as far as
their objects go—need not necessarily be. Mice, who have been artificially stimulated to produce
an excess of dopamine, are motivated to obtain some prize foodstuff (they ‘want’ it) despite
showing none of the usually empirical markers of enjoying (‘liking’) it once it has been obtained.
The converse holds as well. Mice who have been artificially deprived of dopamine may like a
prize very much, but remain entirely unmotivated to expend energy in seeking it out.20
Mesolimbic dopamine functions such that it ‘tags’ the environmental affordances available to the
mouse as rewards. Meanwhile, the neural ‘liking’ function (called “hedonic reaction” in the
literature) occurs in different neural regions in the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum;
rather than responding to dopamine, these “hedonic hotspots” are sensitive to neurotransmitters
associated with opioid and endocannabinoid systems.21 What is good for the goose is good for
the gander: the decoupling of the ‘wanting’ function from the ‘liking’ observed in mice is
evident too during self-administration experiments with cocaine addicts, who continue to ‘want’
cocaine despite ceasing to ‘like’ it during a session.22
The cocaine, the heroin, the alcohol—these are incentive-salience desires, triggered via
conditioned cues in an addict’s environment and tagged as rewards by mesolimbic dopamine.
They are a- or pre-rational. Dill and Holton contrast these semiautomatic, at least partially
subconscious desires (which may or may not be ‘liked’) with what they call cognitive desires.
Cognitive desires are phenomenologically distinct from their incentive-salience kin. They are
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derived rationally from a set of propositions; their objects are generally not the kind of things one
craves; one is never ‘physically compelled’ to obtain one’s cognitive desires.
This is because they are “bound up” with reasons;23 I want to become a philosopher because I
believe I will become rich and famous. When, to my chagrin, I discover that professional
philosophers are categorically poor, unemployed, and unknown, my reason evaporates and the
desire withers. It requires no strength of will or authorial exertion on my part to abolish the
desire. This is not the case for my desire for a cigarette, for heroin, or a drink.24 Whatever reason
motivated their initial wanting, the long shadow of desire can persist well after the logical heft of
the reason has been extinguished.
The apparent paradox in the addict’s experience of physical compulsion is resolved when
understood in light of—and, thus mapped to—the (hypothetical, functional) structure which
emerges from the neuropsychological channels postulated by Robinson’s and Berridge’s
incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. According to the finer-grained, Franfurtean-derived
articulation of the phenomenology of physical compulsion, the “me-but-not-me who takes a
drink” is unable to choose which of their first-order desires becomes their will. My account leads
to a reframing of Frankfurt’s “second-order volitions” as cognitive, reason-bounded desires. I
want to want to ~P because I believe something or other about ~P-ing (e.g., I want to want to ~P
because I want to become a philosopher and I believe that ~P-ing is a necessary condition for my
aspiration’s realization).
Unlike my desire to P, my cognitive desire is not mediated by dopaminergic reward-scheduling.
Ultimately—contra Frankfurt—I have no conflicting first-order desires. I have only the first-
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order desire Σ to P (I ‘want’ cocaine in the sense that I am extraordinarily motivated to seek and
use it) and the cognitive desire (the “second-order volition”) Φ to want to want to ~P. There is,
however, no first-order desire Ψ “wanting to ~P” upon which my cognitive desire Φ can attach.
However—especially when I ‘want’ to P but do not especially ‘like’ P-ing—the salience of Φ
leads to my mistaking it for Ψ.
V. Is addiction a discrete kind? From Flanagan’s taxonomy, we salvaged a skeletal definition
of phenomenological addiction. We articulated its most controversial component, physical
compulsion, and proceeded to posit a commensurable neuroscientific explanans. In so doing,
however, have we deprived “addiction” of its uniqueness? Is compulsion, in the sense outlined
above, experienced only during addiction proper? Or is it the sort of experience that humans
have all of the time, in ordinary, nonaddictive contexts?
Consider the following: coffee makes my wife anxious. She tells me—and, by proxy, herself—
that she is taking a break from it, starting tomorrow. And yet, when next the sun rises, she is
back at the pot, mug in hand. Is her experience best described in terms of physical compulsion?
Does her behavior constitute an insoluble paradox? Caffeine, of course, is an addictive
substance, so perhaps we need a more theoretically-innocent example. I want to write a paper on
addiction; instrumentally, I know that the consequences that are likely to follow the publication
of a well-argued position are things that I want. And yet, I find myself drawn instead to
cognitively-undemanding tasks: reading the news, checking my phone, responding to email.
How is it that I can—even in the moment—consciously desire that some state of affairs come to
pass, and yet do the opposite of what will bring it about?
The experience is familiar to everyone. We want to have the salad but reach for the potato chips;
we want to enjoy a small piece of chocolate, but devour the bar. We want to read The Critique of
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Pure Reason but end up on the couch, binge-watching Game of Thrones. If we have not been
taught to speak of our experience in terms of compulsion or loss of volition, then we may simply
label these discrepancies between our desires and our behavior as lapses in willpower.
Qualitatively, however, they feel the same (to me) as the ‘me-but-not-me’ who takes the drink or
the drug.
The original research around incentive salience and sensitization may have been initially
interested in mechanisms responsible for drug addiction, but its primary discovery was that
‘wanting’ is mediated entirely via mesolimbic dopamine and is only contingently related to
‘liking.’25 All drugs of addiction act on dopamine production in the brain (though individual
mechanisms vary across pharmacological profiles), so incentive-sensitization can account neatly
for the phenomenon of drug addiction.26 However, it is uncontroversial that the symptoms which
manifest across behavioral addictions—like to gambling, to gaming, or even to checking one’s
social media feed—are virtually indistinguishable from those manifesting across drug
addictions.27 These ‘rewards’ are similarly mediated by dopamine. There may be and likely is
conceptual fine-tuning that remains necessary for our empirical research into how the brain
behaves when it is addicted to World of Warcraft as opposed to fentanyl, but with functionally
similar inputs leading to functionally homogenous symptoms, signs point to the difference being
one of degree and not of kind. In both cases, an agent is compelled to want something with a
fervor that is out of alignment with her liking of it.
If, however, addiction—or any of our incentive-salience derived, ‘wanting’ behaviors—is a
matter of unconscious, dopamine-fueled animal impulse, how do we get anything done? Because
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our higher selves do, occasionally, prevail. We pick the salad. We write the paper. Why can we
addicts overcome our base desires where they concern the mundane, but experience an
overwhelming compulsion when presented with a drink or a drug? Firstly, it is not the case that
addicts always are at the mercy of their unwanted first-order desires. Even the heroin addict in
the grip of her addiction will at times exhibit temporary control, perhaps when her infant
daughter is in the car with her or before a crucial interview with her probation officer. Once
again, a single explanatory mechanism accounts for the abstaining addict and the successful
dieter.
Baumeister et al. posit a functional entity: willpower as a finite cognitive resource.28 Their egodepletion theory is borne out again and again in experiment. Subjects are less likely to choose a
healthy food after having already exerted self-control during a prior task; they are more likely to
ignore a stranger in need of help after having behaved altruistically in the recent past.29
Importantly for the case of the addict, long-term desires—the more cognitive, reason-bounded
desires—are also more difficult to pursue for ego-depleted subjects.30
The precise neural correlates of the willpower resource require further empirical research. The
method in which it functions is also up for debate: Neil Levy, informed by George Ainslie’s
theory of hyperbolic discounting referenced in “What Is It Like to Be an Addict?” argues that the
“neural adaptations characteristic of addiction provide a mechanism for [shifts in judgment].”31 I
take Levy to mean that addictions—behavioral or substance—involve a pathological rewiring of
an agent’s perceived reward schedule.32 When an addict is triggered by some environmental or
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physiological cue, the brain attempts to modify the perceived expected utility of some
affordance. The mirrored medicine cabinet triggers the addict to reevaluate its possible contents
as more valuable than they otherwise would be.
Self-control or willpower, then, functions as a kind of firewall against this rescheduling process.
With it, the schedule remains unchanged. In the ego-depleted subject, preferences are modified;
the agent prefers the immediate reward in the medicine cabinet to the more abstract, temporallydistal ends whose realization requires her abstinence.
Wallace’s competing account of the willpower mechanism sees it as primarily motivational. In it,
an agent can “[reason] correctly” but still fail to “comply with the deliberated verdict.”33 Here I
side with Wallace. It is my belief that only by conceiving of willpower as a limited motivational
resource that we can (roughly, metaphorically) map ego-depletion theory onto addicted
phenomenology. This is because addicts do not experience temporary irrationality whereby we
briefly imagine our drug of choice to have higher utility than it does. Likewise, the recalcitrant
dieter does not mistakenly evaluate the bag of potato chips as being a healthier option than the
salad. In both cases, an agent’s reasoning faculties remain intact; it is just that we are unable to
pursue what we evaluate as being in our ultimate best interest. Wallace’s motivation hypothesis
is structurally analogous to the relevant phenomenology of compulsion, where Levy’s is not;
therefore, only the former fulfills the commensurability requirement.
In this section, I attempted to demonstrate how the most unique of addiction’s
phenomenologically-salient features—the physical compulsion—is distinct from ordinary lapses
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in willpower in degree only and not different in kind.34 In the final section of this essay, I
propose that the (superficially) apparent distinction between “addictive” compulsion and
ordinary phenomenology stems from the theory-laden nature of introspection. The hermeneutical
resources available to the addict are derived from the prevailing popular, historical, and medical
conceptualizations of addiction.
VI. Theory-ladenness of addictive phenomenology. If addictive phenomenology just is
garden-variety human phenomenology, why is it that (even, especially) those of us who have
experienced addiction testify to a fracturing of our agency? Why do we speak so readily in terms
that are unlike those used to describe ordinary ‘lapses’ in willpower? I hold that we speak of
addiction in these terms, frankly, because that is how we are taught to speak.35
Over the past century, there have been two leading conceptual models of addiction. The first is a
folk-psychological theory: the moral model of addiction identifies the consumption of a drug as
an agent’s choice, and an immoral choice to boot.36 We—addicts and alcoholics—get high
because we want to, devil take the rest, and the model condemns the bad actions of the weakwilled agent. The theoretical influence of this model is immediately obvious in our social and
legal institutions; possession of most drugs is a felony offense, the people who use them are
irresponsible and dangerous, and they belong—and usually end up in—jail.

Perhaps there is a ‘quantity’ of the willpower resource required for quotidian tasks that is lesser than the quantity
required to, e.g., turn down a drug of addiction. In the explicitly speculatory mode, I suspect something like this to
be the case. This might allow us to differentiate between addictive compulsion and non despite their being of a kind.
35
We need not be card-carrying eliminativists to forward this thesis. When an addict reports her experience of
“physical compulsion,” we need not insist that “compulsion” lacks a referent or is a folk-psychological,
Churchlandian chimera. We need only maintain that the veracity of introspective reports is susceptible—at least in
principle—to error. See Schwitzgebel, “Descartes Inverted,” for a discussion of introspection and fallibility.
36
Pickard, “What We’re Not Talking about When We Talk about Addiction.” 37.
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Armed with good intentions, and recognizing the predicament of many addicts to be a far cry
from the hedonistic lifestyle of the idealized Dionysian reveler, treatment centers, psychologists,
and neuroscientists alike postulated a new, more humane alternative: the diseased-brain model, a
common variation of which sees drug addictions as always a behavioral manifestation of what is
essentially a dysfunction of the brain.37 In eschewing the moral model, the diseased-brain model
allows for a vindication of addicts. Unlike the weak-willed truant who could have picked herself
up by the bootstraps and gone to work—she could have done otherwise—the addict suffers from
a medical incapacitation of her agency.38
It is natural that, as addicts, we find the diseased-brain model to be the more palatable option; it
removes much of the personal culpability involved, which—in many cases—is no small gift.
Nevertheless, the diseased-brain model is almost certainly incorrect. The etiology of a malady
such as Alzheimer’s involves an actual degradation of neural tissues; as an exemplar, it admits of
a wholly physical proximal cause. Behavioral manifestations stem from myelinic degeneration,
but they are not the kind of symptom that can be remedied with behavioral therapies.
Constitutively, Alzheimer’s just is a brain state involving a degree of axonal or myelinic
degeneration.39 Addiction, it must be acknowledged, is not like this. Though it may be physically
instantiated in the brain, its proximal cause is not best conceptualized in terms of somatic
pathology.40
Lacking an established phenomenological vocabulary with which to describe our experience,
addicts’ recourse is to (tacitly) adopt a kind of jury-rigged hodgepodge, borrowing terms from

37

Graham, The Disordered Mind, 156. This too is the etiology that the DSM-5 uses to justify its taxonomic schema.
See Levy, “Resisting ‘Weakness of the Will.’” for a discussion (and ultimate dissolution) of the distinction
between weak-willed agents and compulsive agents. The diseased-brain model puts addicts in the latter category.
39
Salvadores et al., “Axonal Degeneration during Aging and Its Functional Role in Neurodegenerative Disorders.”
40
Graham, The Disordered Mind.
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both the moral and medical models. Thus we speak of our experience as being like a hijacking,
or as being similar to that of the diabetic; paradoxically, the experiences are simultaneously
moments of great moral turmoil—we experience shame, guilt, remorse. The prevailing (folk)
theoretical framework involved in the treatment of addiction—mutual help organizations like
Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous—is in part responsible for institutionalizing and validating
this bizarre ‘ontology.’
From the vantage of its theoretical amalgam, addiction is, on the one horn, a spiritual malady
emerging from a person’s selfish refusal to rely on a higher power.41 On the other, it is an
incurable, progressive, and ultimately fatal somatic illness which can be arrested but never
cured.42 The stockbroker-penned ‘Big Book’ of Alcoholics Anonymous, and the heady nostrum
contained therein, recommends a diversity of treatments varying from the confessing of one’s
sexual deviancies to another alcoholic, to the more traditional faith-healing palliatives of prayer
and supplication.43
For my purposes, it is enough to point out the text’s relentless emphasis on powerlessness. There
is little conceptual daylight between the phenomenological reports of powerlessness and those of
physical compulsion. Where difference emerges, it is causal; where the latter is agnostic, the
former is bolder—powerlessness follows necessarily from godlessness (or self-will). Either,
however, can be described in Flanagan’s parlance: P & ~P.

41

Alcoholics Anonymous. 62.
Ibid., 30-33.
43
Here I am perhaps too eager to grind my own axe. The (Jamesean-endorsed) ‘Big Book’ of Alcoholics
Anonymous proposes what seems to me a fantastical ‘theory’ of addiction. Nevertheless, the “Minnesota model,” as
it is called, seems to work for some addicts. See Schnabel, “Neuroscience: Rethinking Rehab” for a sympathetic (if
uncritical) history of Wilson’s therapy; see Peele, “AA and Abstinence as Prevention Techniques” for a blunter
indictment.
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VII. Concluding Remarks. In this essay, I have argued that the phenomenological character of
addicted experience exists on a spectrum continuous with ordinary human phenomenology. I
have relied extensively upon Owen Flanagan’s excellent work as a foil for my own case. In so
doing, I first followed his Natural Method, the relevant posits of which I formulated as the
commensurability requirement. The commensurability requirement stated that scientific
explanantia must structurally analogous with corresponding phenomenological explananda.
The requirement proved too keen a razor when applied to the excesses of Flanagan’s proposed
addictive ontology; thus, in recovering from it a coherent, maximally-simple definition of
“addiction” I salvaged just two necessary phenomenological conditions, a mental obsession and
a physical compulsion, which I took to be jointly constitutive of the phenomenology of addiction.
Of these, I deemed only physical compulsion in need of (theoretical) explanation.
I articulated the compulsion criterion according to Harry Frankfurt’s account of first-order
desires and second-order volitions, and submitted evidence supporting the incentive-sensitization
theory of addiction. I deemed it a satisfactorily-commensurable explanation of the
phenomenological character of addicted compulsion; I then made the case that the theory’s
posited neuropsychological mechanisms explained also ordinary ‘lapses’ in willpower, an
experience common to addicts and nonaddicts alike. Ego-depletion theory and its construal of
willpower as limited motivational resource completed the explanation in a manner relevant for
the actual phenomenology of compulsion as well as ordinary lapses.
Finally, I acknowledged that my account entails the existence of a series of egregious errors in
our phenomenological reports of addicted experience. I proposed a mechanism of (folk) theoryladenness, in which a vocabulary of addicted introspection is tacitly informed by prevailing and
historical models of addiction.
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A host of criticisms could be levied against the case I have outlined above. I will address just
one. It is the pragmatic concern that—if I am correct and that addiction is best explained in terms
of a phenomenology continuous with ordinary human experience—that we risk backsliding,
returning to a model of addiction that sees addicts as weak-willed agents and moral failures
rather than the foci of complex, intersecting causal factors cultural, neural, and psychological.
This fear is plausible only insofar as we mistake our own ordinary experience of free will and
volition for being more free than it in fact is. Furthermore, the account of ego-depletion I’ve
given leaves open the possibility that addiction is of a kind with garden-variety lapses in
willpower while still admitting of some bifurcation, beyond which it becomes physically
impossible to overcome one’s cravings, even if the mechanism for so doing is functionally
equivalent to ordinary volitional exertions.
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